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NOTE
DEFINING  FAIR  NOTICE:  LOGICAL  OUTGROWTH
DOCTRINE  APPLIED  TO  THE  WATERS
OF THE UNITED STATES
Henry L. Lifton*
INTRODUCTION
American navigable waters are an important and strategic natural
resource.  Exploration, commerce, and navigation marked the early water
history of the United States.1  In the nineteenth century, Congress passed
statutes supporting the public right to exploration, commerce, and naviga-
tion.2  By the twentieth century, the focus of navigable water regulation
shifted to pollution control.  Congress passed a series of water pollution acts
culminating in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, which included the Clean Water Act (CWA).3  In order to support a
pollution control policy, the CWA prohibits, inter alia, discharge of any
dredge or fill material into navigable waters,4 which is further defined as
“waters of the United States.”5
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; Bachelor of Science,
United States Military Academy, 2008.  I would like to thank Professor Bill Kelley for his
advice and guidance.  I also would like to thank the members of the Notre Dame Law Review
for their helpful comments.  As always, all mistakes are my own.
1 The Supreme Court acknowledged the need for a broad definition of “navigable
waters,” and in 1851 it expanded federal jurisdiction beyond the traditional, limited
English definition of “navigable waters.” See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 443, 464 (1851).
2 See, e.g., Rivers and Harbors Act, ch. 425, §§ 9–20, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151–55 (1899)
(version codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403–04, 406–09, 411–16, 418, 502,
549(a), 686–87 (2012)).
3 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376); see also Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715, 787 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the history of the
Clean Water Act).
4 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
5 Id. § 1362(7).
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In the years following the passage of the CWA, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, historically the lead federal government proponent for naviga-
tion, defined the phrase “waters of the United States” broadly.6  By 2000, the
Corps’ definition was so broad that the Supreme Court issued two decisions
sharply curtailing the definition of waters of the United States.7  In 2014, the
Corps of Engineers and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sought to
bring clarity to the scope of “waters of the United States” through notice-and-
comment rulemaking (“Proposed Rule”).8  On June 29, 2015, the agencies
published a joint final rule (“Final Rule”)9 that immediately prompted law-
suits across the entire country.10
The legal challenges to the Final Rule seek to invalidate the regulation
on both procedural and substantive grounds.11  Procedurally, the petitioners
will likely challenge whether the final rule is a logical outgrowth of the pro-
posed rule.  This current legal controversy provides a convenient backdrop to
propose a new method to analyze logical outgrowth.  This Note will use the
Proposed and Final Rule as an administrative law case study.  Part I will
review the historical development of logical outgrowth doctrine.  Logical out-
growth is a fact-specific inquiry.  There does not exist, however, a categorical
framework to help courts and agencies with evaluating agency actions.  Part
II proposes a new categorical framework to evaluate logical outgrowth.  This
Note argues that it is beneficial to group similar agency procedural cases in
order to analyze agency actions and avoid defects in the procedural process.
The goal, simply, is to solve problems.  Part III returns to our case study and
applies the newly developed framework to the waters of the United States
Final Rule and argues that the Final Rule fails by applying the procedural
framework established in Part II.  Finally, Part IV reviews the substantive law
that courts will eventually confront and argues that the Final Rule is substan-
tively within the authority Congress delegated to the Corps of Engineers and
the EPA.
6 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724 (plurality opinion) (first citing Permits for Activities in
Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,324–25 (July 25, 1975) (to be
codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 209); then citing Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Mate-
rial into Waters of the United States, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,144, 37,144 (July 19, 1977) (to be
codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323)).
7 See id. at 724–26 (first citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121 (1985); then citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)).
8 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 22,188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts.
110, 112, 116–17, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 400).
9 See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054, 37,073–101 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts. 110,
112, 116–17, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 400).
10 See, e.g., In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 805–06 (6th Cir. 2015).
11 See id. at 807 (concluding that petitioners “demonstrated a substantial possibility of
success on the merits” and “the rulemaking process . . . is facially suspect”).
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I. LOGICAL OUTGROWTH DOCTRINE
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed in 1946, is the default
statute for federal agencies promulgating regulations.12  As originally con-
ceived, the APA provided for either formal or informal rulemaking.13  Yet,
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., read the
formal rulemaking provision very narrowly and since that case, virtually all
federal rulemaking, and attendant judicial review, operates in the informal
rulemaking channel.14
Section 553(b), the section governing APA informal rulemaking,
requires federal agencies contemplating rulemaking to publish a “[g]eneral
notice” in the Federal Register.15  Furthermore, the section requires that the
agency publish the “terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description
of the subjects and issues involved.”16  Next, the agency receives comments
from the public on the substance of the proposed rule (hence the common
title: notice-and-comment rulemaking).17  Finally, the agency publishes a
final rule incorporating the technical expertise and wisdom of both the
agency itself and the public comment.18  Logical outgrowth doctrine is a judi-
cial interpretation of the proper fit between the proposed and final rules.
The doctrine states that an agency’s final rule should be a logical out-
growth of the proposed rule.19  This requirement prohibits agencies from
using the comment period as a “carte blanche to establish a rule contrary to
its original proposal.”20  But logical outgrowth is not a straightjacket on the
12 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2012)).
13 Informal rulemaking is governed by 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).  Formal rulemaking is trig-
gered by language in 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), stating that when “rules are required by statute to
be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of
this title apply instead of this subsection.” Id.
14 See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1973) (holding that
because Congress specifically chose the language “on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing” in the APA, other statutory language that was similar, for example, “after
hearing,” but not the same would not trigger sections 556 and 557 of the APA (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 553(c))); see also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742,
756–57 (1972) (noting that sections 556 and 557 of the APA are only triggered by specific
language of 553(c)).  Even in the years immediately following Florida East Coast Railway and
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., scholars recognized the decreased viability of formal rulemak-
ing. See, e.g., Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for Agency Rulemaking,
87 HARV. L. REV. 782, 791–92 (1974).
15 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
16 Id. § 553(b)(3).
17 Id. § 553(c).
18 Id.
19 The first case using the logical outgrowth language was South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,
504 F.2d 646, 659 (1st Cir. 1974).  Cases prior to South Terminal Corp. understood that
agencies could not act arbitrarily, but acknowledged there must be some termination point
in the proceedings. See, e.g., Logansport Broad. Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24, 27–28
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
20 Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir. 1985).
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agency—it is a balancing of an agency’s need for flexibility and the public’s
need for fair notice.21  It would be rather absurd to require agencies to initi-
ate a new round of notice-and-comment rulemaking whenever a minor
change occurs between the proposed rule and the final rule.22  Otherwise an
agency would not be able to learn from public comments.  Ultimately, the
objective of logical outgrowth is fair notice without imposing an unreasona-
ble burden on the agency.23
If an agency fails to follow proper procedure, the judicial remedy could
be a complete remand of the rule, a partial remand of the rule, or a remand
without vacating the rule.24  The default remedy for procedural errors is to
remand the rule to the agency for compliance with the APA’s procedural
requirements.25  A procedural defect is a separate inquiry from the agency’s
substantive interpretation of the authorizing statute or the constitutionality
of the statute itself.26  In some logical outgrowth cases, a court will only
remand the elements of the rule that did not follow proper process.27  In
some instances, a court will remand the rule for an agency to follow proper
procedure, but leave the rule in place.28  Courts understand that in some
instances a complete remand would inflict large social costs, or private par-
ties have a reliance interest in what they thought the proposed rule would
be.29  The upshot here is that courts have some flexibility in crafting a rem-
edy, but generally a defect in the process will only delay, not stop, a
regulation.
The term logical outgrowth represents a relatively uncontroversial pro-
position—a final rule should be logically connected to its predecessor—but
without additional explanation the phrase serves little analytical purpose.
Courts of appeals have attempted to flesh out the doctrine by adding explan-
atory language to the amorphous concept of logical outgrowth.  Thus, courts
will routinely state that a final rule will be valid if interested parties “should
have anticipated” that a change from the proposed to final rule was possi-
21 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007) (“The object,
in short, is one of fair notice.”).
22 See Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
23 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 551 U.S. at 174.
24 See Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the
Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 637–40 (1994) (describing a mini-survey of various proce-
dural reversal outcomes in a D.C. Circuit calendar year).
25 See Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in
Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 294 (2003).
26 Id. at 293–94 (arguing that there is a distinction between an agency failing to sub-
stantively administer the law and a procedural defect).
27 See infra subsection II.B.2.
28 See Levin, supra note 25, at 294–95 (citing Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58
F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Wald, supra note 24, at 638 n.72 (discussing cases where
rule remained in place).
29 See Levin, supra note 25, at 298–303.
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ble.30  Another common formulation is that the interested public does not
have to “divine . . . the unspoken thoughts” of the agency.31  Of course, it is
one thing to repeat these phrases and entirely another to discern any applica-
ble guidance for future courts and agencies searching for useful guidance.32
This Note argues that there are workable categories in which to segregate
different types of logical outgrowth cases.  Part II is descriptive and seeks to
distill workable categories of logical outgrowth by analyzing historical logical
outgrowth cases.
II. LOGICAL OUTGROWTH CATEGORIES
Defining the contours of logical outgrowth doctrine is difficult, despite
more than four decades of cases affirming and reversing agency rules.
Before attempting to outline workable categories, it is necessary to acknowl-
edge the limitations of such an exercise.  Logical outgrowth is inherently a
fact-based, case-by-case analysis; a proposed rule is either procedurally valid
or not and each iteration of logical outgrowth thereafter presents a new rule
and a new notice-and-comment rulemaking process.  This makes logical out-
growth susceptible to a lack of clarity from case to case, and a doctrine about
which it is difficult to draw any generalities.33
The value of this inquiry is not found in generalizations about particular
rules.  Instead, the successes and failures of agency rulemaking processes are
sufficiently similar across time to allow for categorical grouping and thus
assist agencies, the public, and courts in avoiding the pitfalls of logical out-
growth.  Part II’s methodology is to identify and analyze cases, often but not
exclusively, from the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in order to group
the success or failure of logical outgrowth arguments by type.34  Section II.A
defines categories where an agency is able to demonstrate that its final rule
was a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule.  Section II.B defines categories
where the agency fails to demonstrate that it gave fair notice and the court
determined there was no logical outgrowth.
30 Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (quoting City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
31 Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d
1250, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (first quoting Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 751 (D.C. Cir.
1991); then quoting Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
32 For example, some scholars suggest agencies only need to follow the four corners of
the APA without providing additional, descriptive guidance. See Phillip M. Kannan, The
Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 223–24 (1996).
33 Creating tests or standards that are based on concepts like totality of the circum-
stances or the reasonable person, an appellate judge may just be engaging in glorified fact-
finding. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1180–81 (1989).  Obviously, logical outgrowth is not described in totality of the circum-
stances language, but the fact-specific, case-by-case assessments to determine logical out-
growth are, perhaps, not far off.
34 See generally Eric M. Fraser et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 131 (2013) (describing why and how the D.C. Circuit’s caseload is dispropor-
tionately administrative law).
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A. Categories Where Courts Affirm Logical Outgrowth
1. Agency Contemplating Specific Change
Courts will uphold a final rule if the notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) expressly asks for comment on a particular issue or otherwise makes
it clear that an agency was contemplating a specific change.35  This category
of logical outgrowth is the simplest expression of the doctrine.  If an agency
asks for public comment on an issue and then modifies its final rule based on
the comments, then logical outgrowth applies.  In Owner-Operator Drivers Asso-
ciation v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the agency proposed a rule
for long-haul truckers that would allow them to split their ten-hour rest
period into two segments, including one of at least eight hours.36  The peti-
tioners protested that the notice was too broad and unspecific to allow them
to comment effectively.  However, the notice said that the agency “will con-
sider a variety of possible changes . . . including but not limited to: . . . estab-
lishing a minimum time for one of the two ‘splits,’ such as 5 hours, 8 hours, or some
other appropriate level.”37  The final rule adopted the eight-hour require-
ment.38  This represents the plainest logical outgrowth category: the agency
offers options, the public provides feedback, and the agency selects one of
the options.  As the court in Owner-Operator Drivers Association stated, the final
rule was “reasonably foreseeable.”39
2. Partial Abandonment of Proposed Rule
Courts will affirm a partial abandonment of a proposed rule if the
agency provides some notice that it could be persuaded that various provi-
sions are unnecessary.40  Stated another way, the public has fair notice when
the agency proposes a broad rule at the outset, announces it is open to a
smaller scope, and ultimately chooses a smaller scope than the proposed
rule.  A case illustrative of this proposition is Association of American Railroads
35 See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 494
F.3d 188, 210 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397, 412
(2013) (holding that FCC “sunset” rule was a logical outgrowth when proposed rule gave
public notice that a viewability rule was in danger of being phased out, i.e., a sunset
provision).
36 Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, 494 F.3d at 209.
37 Id. at 209–10 (emphasis in original) (quoting Hours of Service of Drivers, 70 Fed.
Reg. 3339, 3349–50 (Jan. 24, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 385, 390, 395)).  The
petitioners also challenged that the second rest period requirement was not indicated, but
again the notice clearly covered this possibility as well. See id.
38 Id. at 209.
39 Id. at 210 (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 175
(2007)); see also City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 715 (2007) (stating that the EPA
asked specific questions in its notice that would have led cities to believe that the final rule
would implement the substance of the specific questions).
40 See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 38 F.3d 582, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per
curiam).
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v. Department of Transportation.41  There, the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) issued a final rule covering a limited number of railroad safety provi-
sions and stated that a more general Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) regulation would cover any and all other bridge safety
matters.42  The petitioners alleged that the FRA did not give sufficient notice
that it was considering using OSHA safety regulations.43  The court reasoned
that the FRA chose to promulgate a narrower scope of regulation than it
originally proposed, the FRA gave notice it might use the OSHA rule, and,
therefore, the court determined the rule was a logical outgrowth.44  Thus,
the court affirmed a final rule that included a smaller scope than what was
originally proposed.45  Importantly, the agency gave warning that it was open
to reducing its scope.46
Courts will also uphold an agency’s final rule that elects not to adopt
aspects of the proposed rule and the agency’s requested comment on feasi-
bility or discarding an element, as was the case in Miami-Dade County v. U.S.
EPA.47  Pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water Act, the EPA regulated parame-
ters for state underground injection control sites (essentially where pollu-
tants can enter the drinking water supply).48  The proposed rule offered two
different options for regulating municipal disposal wells and proposed a
“non-endangerment demonstration,” which would have required the regu-
lated entity to show that the well did not exceed drinking water standards.49
In its final rule, the EPA abandoned the non-endangerment requirement
because the other elements of the final rule would obviate the concern the
non-endangerment requirement sought to address.50  While the proposed
rule did not give specific notice that the EPA was considering abandoning
the non-endangerment requirement, the court recognized that comments on
a different (but similar) element of the proposed rule demonstrated the
irrelevance of the non-endangerment rule.51  The petitioners demonstrated,
through their comments, that non-endangerment was not effective and thus
41 See id.
42 See id. at 584–85.
43 See id. at 588.
44 See id. at 589.
45 The court’s conclusion was not without controversy.  Judge Henderson claimed that
the FRA’s original notice of proposed rulemaking did not contemplate enforcement of
OSHA standards by OSHA and that such a formulation “stretched [logical outgrowth]
almost to its breaking point.” Id. (Henderson, J., concurring).
46 Id. (majority opinion).
47 529 F.3d 1049, 1059–62.
48 See id. at 1052.
49 See id. at 1054 (citing Revision to Federal Underground Injection Control (UIC)
Requirements for Class I—Municipal Wells in Florida, 65 Fed. Reg. 42,234, 42,244 (July 7,
2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 146)).
50 See id. at 1057.
51 See id. at 1060–62.
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they should have had notice that an element of the rule would be
abandoned.52
Clearly, an agency cannot abandon a proposed rule in favor of an alto-
gether new approach during the comment period without some sort of
notice.  The court in Miami-Dade County determined that the administrative
record demonstrated that the parties had notice through their comments on
a similar element of the proposed rule.53  The agency in Association of Ameri-
can Railroads gave notice it was considering a partial abandonment of its
rule.54  Thus, it is not enough that an agency might refrain from taking a
specific step, but there must also be fair notice that partial abandonment was
on the table.55
3. Final Rule Within Proposed Range of Alternatives
Courts will find that a final rule was a logical outgrowth where the final
rule was within a range of foreseeable alternatives, as demonstrated in City of
Waukesha v. EPA.56  There, the EPA, pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water
Act, issued a Notice of Data Availability (NODA) to update its drinking water
rules for the appropriate maximum contaminant level (MCL) for four pollu-
tants: two radium isotopes, a naturally occurring uranium, and beta/photon
emitters.57  In 1976, the EPA had established MCLs for the radium isotopes
and beta/photon emitters, but not for uranium.58  The NODA proposed to
maintain the 1976 levels for radium and beta/photon emitters and proposed
to set the MCL for the naturally occurring uranium at 20, 40, or 80 micro-
grams per liter (“mg/L”).59  The final rule set the MCL at 30 mg/L.60  At oral
argument the petitioners conceded that they could not show any substantial
difference between the final rule of 30 mg/L and the proposed rule’s 20 or 40
mg/L level.61  This intuitively makes sense because when the EPA proposed
20, 40, or 80 mg/L it essentially gave notice that it could reasonably choose
any number in the 20 to 80 mg/L ranges.  Thus, the agency met the logical
52 See id. at 1060.
53 Id. at 1060–62.
54 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 38 F.3d 582, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per
curiam).
55 See also Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. U.S. EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that “a simple retreat to the status quo ante can properly be viewed as a ‘logical out-
growth’” (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1242–43 (D.C. Cir.
1988))).
56 320 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
57 See id. at 231.  The Safe Drinking Water Act establishes a slightly different notice-
and-comment regime from the default Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, but the court
noted that other cases held logical outgrowth to be applicable and adopted this reading of
logical outgrowth. See id. at 245.
58 Id. at 231–32.  The 1976 levels were: 5 picocuries/Liter for the radium isotopes and
4 millirems for the beta/photon emitters. Id.
59 Id. at 232.
60 Id.
61 See id. at 246.
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outgrowth burden when it selected one option within a range of options it
originally published for public comment.
A second example comes from Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Authority
v. EPA.62  There, the EPA proposed, under its Clean Air Act authority, to
regulate three distinct categories of small municipal waste combustion
(MWC) units: Class A, for nonrefractory units with capacity greater than 250
tons per day; Class B, for refractory units in plants of the same capacity; and
Class C, for all plants at or under the 250 tons-per-day threshold.63  The final
rule collapsed three categories into two: Class I, for MWC units in large
capacity plants; and Class II, for MWC units in small capacity plants.64  After
publishing the proposed rule with three categories, the EPA received nega-
tive comments opposing different categories, reevaluated the categorization
scheme, and ultimately consolidated its categories.65  Condensing three cate-
gories into two was within the foreseeable range of alternatives.  The court
concluded that the EPA specifically invited comment on the different catego-
ries and numerous parties commented on the possible range of
alternatives.66
This category should not be conflated with our first category (agency
contemplating specific change) because the agency did not specifically iden-
tify which alternative it would select; only that a selection from within the
range was possible.  This category is also distinguished from the second cate-
gory (partial abandonment) because no substance is actually abandoned; the
agency only selects a course of action (or inaction).
4. Harmless Error
In some instances, a court will affirm an agency final rule, even when the
final rule is not a logical outgrowth, if the result of the final rule is a harmless
error.67  This category stems not from section 553 of the APA, but from the
judicial review provision in section 706.68  The underpinning of harmless
error is that the plaintiff must state that prejudice flowed from the agency’s
error.69  There are two categories of procedural harmless error.  The first
category is when the receipt of comments would not have changed the
62 358 F.3d 936, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam). But cf. Small Refiner Lead Phase-
Down Task Force v. U.S. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Agency notice must
describe the range of alternatives being considered with reasonable specificity.”).
63 See Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d at 941.
64 See id. at 951.  Large capacity were all plants exceeding an aggregate of 250 tons per
day and small capacity plants were all those 250 tons per day and below.  Classes A and B
were condensed into Class I. Id.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 952.
67 See First Am. Discount Corp. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 222 F.3d
1008, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
68 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“[D]ue account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial
error.”).
69 See id.
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agency’s final outcome, and the second occurs when the invalid portion of
the final rule’s impact was so minor that a second round of comment would
not accomplish anything.70  In United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Marshall, OSHA proposed engineering controls for the lead industry.71  In
the final rule, it changed its position and allowed the industry some flexibility
in implementing the engineering controls.72  The court applied a harmless
error rule, albeit without much explanation, to say that OSHA would have
taken the same action regardless of the petitioner’s comments.73
First American Discount Corp. v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission illus-
trates the second category.74  The court stated that the portion of the final
rule to which the petitioner objected was merely an alternative to a primary
requirement.75  The primary requirement was lawful and the petitioner had
opportunity to comment on the primary requirement.76  Critically, the peti-
tioner was free not to use the alternative requirement of the regulation.77  A
party claiming error on the part of an agency must state a prejudicial harm.
Both cases demonstrate that courts will use their reasoned judgment to deter-
mine whether the error was harmless.
5. Actual Notice Cures Defect
Finally, when a party has actual notice of an agency’s change between
proposed and final rules, then actual notice will cure the defect in the notice-
and-comment rulemaking.78  This category derives, in part, from section 552
of the APA, which states that “[e]xcept to the extent that a person has actual
and timely notice . . . thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to
resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the
Federal Register and not so published.”79  Courts distinguish actual notice
received from an agency from notice received by participation in the com-
ment process.80  Thus, the actual notice must come from the agency—for
example by participation in meetings with an agency—and not from moni-
toring other comments in the public record.81  There is no requirement to
70 See Arnold Rochvarg, Adequacy of Notice of Rulemaking Under the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act—When Should a Second Round of Notice and Comment Be Provided?, 31 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 18–20 (1981).
71 647 F.2d 1189, 1223–24 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
72 See id. at 1225.
73 See id.
74 222 F.3d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
75 Id. at 1015–16.
76 Id at 1016.
77 See id.
78 See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. U.S. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
79 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
80 See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
81 See Small Refiner, 705 F.2d at 549 (“As a general rule, EPA must itself provide notice
of a regulatory proposal.  Having failed to do so, it cannot bootstrap notice from a
comment.”).
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monitor comments from other members of the public.  In sum, the first
three categories demonstrate proper procedures by agencies resulting in
favorable outcomes.  The last two categories demonstrate instances where
there is a defect in the procedural process, but the defect is not fatal to the
agency.  Section II.B covers the different categories where an agency action
fails logical outgrowth doctrine.
B. Categories Where Agency Action Reversed
1. Final Rule Presents “First Opportunity” for Comment
The starkest example of a logical outgrowth failure is when an agency’s
final rule is entirely disconnected from any notice in the proposed rule and
thus a new round of notice-and-comment would provide the first opportunity
or occasion for the public to comment on the rule.82  In Daimler Trucks North
America LLC v. EPA, the EPA sought to promulgate regulations governing
non-conformance penalties, which allowed heavy-duty motor vehicle manu-
facturers to pay a penalty if their technology lagged behind the EPA’s stan-
dards.83  One component of the proposed rule was whether “substantial
work” was required to meet the penalty emission standard.84  The final rule
redefined the substantial work requirement in three ways and both parties
agreed that the EPA changed the substantial work criterion.85  The court
conclusively stated that the EPA “did not propose, and offered no indication that
it was contemplating, amendments to the ‘substantial work’ criterion.”86
From this conclusion it was not difficult to find there was no logical out-
growth.  When the agency added entirely new definitions to its final rule, it
no longer provided fair notice to the public and a new notice-and-comment
round would have been a first opportunity for comment.
A second example comes from Kooritzky v. Reich.87  The Department of
Labor issued immigrant visas for aliens who had a labor certification from an
employer, a process that took substantial time to complete and therefore
employers were allowed to substitute workers before the Department issued a
visa.88  The Department proposed a rule that would have modified the prior-
ity date determining where the employer stood in the queue.89  The NPRM
stated a relatively narrow scope: it claimed to only be implementing technical
changes, but it would not substantively alter its existing rule.90  Instead, the
final rule ended the ability of the employer to substitute alien workers, a
82 See Daimler Trucks N. Am. LLC v. EPA, 737 F.3d 95, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
83 See id. at 96.
84 Id. at 98.
85 See id. at 99.
86 Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
87 17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
88 See id. at 1510–11.
89 See id. at 1512.
90 See id.
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change nowhere previewed in the proposed rule.91  The proposed rule did
not include the language of the final rule, did not propose abolishing the
employer substitution, and did not mention any explanations for doing the
proceeding actions.92  In sum, the “Department’s interim final rule [did] not
even come close to complying with the notice requirement of [the APA].”93
The first opportunity category represents the quintessential failure by
the agency to offer the public an opportunity to comment on a regulation.
The Kooritzky court deemed such an action insufficient because “[s]omething
is not a logical outgrowth of nothing.”94  Or, colorfully put by a different
court, “[W]e have refused to allow agencies to use the rulemaking process to
pull a surprise switcheroo on regulated entities.”95  This category is the clearest
example of logical outgrowth failure.
2. Final Rule Is Overinclusive
Courts will find a logical outgrowth failure when the final rule covers a
broader scope than originally proposed; essentially the final rule is overinclu-
sive compared to the proposed rule. American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA is
instructive.96  In that case, the EPA proposed to regulate certain manufactur-
ing processes in the steel industry.97  The EPA was under court order to pro-
mulgate regulations for various categories and, as relevant here, one was
“category 19 . . . ‘Iron and Steel Manufacturing’” and the other was “category
23 . . . ‘Ferroalloy Manufacturing,’” which the court termed “specialty
steel.”98  The proposed rule put forward guidelines for Iron and Steel Manu-
facturing (Category 19), but did not mention specialty steel, giving the false
impression it would not be covered by this regulation.99  The interim final
rule covered three specialty steel processes.100  Essentially, the EPA attempted
to extend comments it received for one category to two categories.  The
court concluded that by creating an overinclusive rule, the EPA did not pro-
vide the public an opportunity to comment on specialty steel.
A second example comes from American Frozen Food Institute v. Train.101
Pursuant to its authority under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments, the EPA published a preliminary document listing only three
pollutants that it would regulate for the potato industry.102  The final rule
91 See id.
92 See id. at 1513.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added); see also infra note 126 (discussing id.).
96 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977).
97 See id. at 290.
98 Id. at 291.
99 See id.
100 Id.
101 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
102 Id. at 135.
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included a fourth pollutant, fecal coli, that was not included on the original
list.103  The fourth pollutant did not receive public comment and the EPA
attempted to extend its regulation to cover the fourth pollutant.104  The
court held there was no logical outgrowth, but only as to the fourth pollu-
tant.105  Thus, a final rule will fail when it includes a broader set than what
was originally proposed.
This category, however, usually has a different remedy.  In both cases,
the remedy was limited to the element in the rule that was improperly
promulgated.  In American Frozen Food, only the fecal coli pollutant was
remanded to the agency for proper notice-and-comment procedures.106  In
American Iron and Steel, the court remanded only the portion of the rule per-
taining to the special steel category.107  Thus, if an agency follows proper
procedure for part of the rule, but expands the regulated set, then a court
will only remand the portion of the rule with the procedural defect.
3. Unexpressed Intention of the Agency
A final rule is not a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule when the
final rule places a special emphasis, more detail, or a different emphasis, on
an element of the proposed rule; an agency cannot have an unexpressed
intention.  In Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, the EPA proposed a rule for the criteria to
list a solid waste as a hazardous waste (a listing requirement).108  In its notice,
the EPA described the listing requirement as playing a “largely supplemen-
tary function.”109  Instead, the final rule placed heightened emphasis on the
hazardous waste listing requirement.  The EPA’s final rule explicitly acknowl-
edged this; the court stated “the final criteria for listing are ‘considerably
expanded and more specific’ than those proposed.”110  The court explained
that the proposed rule did not emphasize the complex listing system adopted
in the final rule, and vacated the rule.111  Thus, where an element of the
proposed rule takes on greatly-expanded and specific emphasis in the final
rule, it will not be a logical outgrowth.
In Horsehead Resource Development Co. v. Browner, the EPA proposed a rule
to regulate wet cement process kilns.112  The agency chose to regulate kilns
based on their combustion efficiency and created three tiers under which to
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 292 (3d Cir. 1977).
108 950 F.2d 741, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
109 Id. at 751 (quoting Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification and List-
ing of Hazardous Waste, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,106 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 261)).
110 Id. at 752 (quoting Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification and List-
ing of Hazardous Waste, 45 Fed. Reg. at 33,106).
111 See id.
112 16 F.3d 1246, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
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classify the kilns (Tiers I, II, and III).113  In the proposed rule, the EPA gave
notice that Tier III would include an emission standard based on total hydro-
carbon emissions.114  It did not give any forewarning that it would expand
Tier III to include not only an emission standard based on total hydrocar-
bons, but also two additional requirements: to identify principal organic haz-
ardous constituents and conduct an onsite health assessment.115  The court
said that the omission of the dual-baseline requirements for kilns was “critical
because notice of individual parts of a proposed rule is not necessarily notice
of the whole.”116  In the proposed rule, Tier III had only one element.  The
final rule expanded Tier III to include three elements.  Thus, the agency
improperly added more detail to Tier III and failed logical outgrowth.
Finally, in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Surface Transportation Board, the Sur-
face Transportation Board (STB) proposed to allow the rail industry to sug-
gest comparison groups drawn from the past year of rate data in order to
determine benchmark figures for rail rates.117  The final rule, instead,
allowed the industry to draw from the past four most recent years of data.118
Like the previous cases in this category, the petitioners argued that the
NPRM invited comment on drawing comparison groups from the most
recent year, but gave no notice that a broader data set would be consid-
ered.119  The court acknowledged that the “final rule did not amount to a
complete turnaround from the NPRM.”120  Yet, fair notice was lacking
because there was no way for interested parties to anticipate that STB would
expand the data set from one year to four years.121  Thus, an agency cannot
publish a proposed rule, modify it substantively, and put a different emphasis
on elements within the final rule.
4. Clarifying vs. Altering Language
A rule that proposes only to clarify an existing language, but in fact sub-
stantively alters the rule will not be a logical outgrowth.  In Allina Health Ser-
vices v. Sebelius, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
proposed only to clarify the formula for calculating hospital inpatient reim-
bursement under Medicare and Medicaid.122  In the notice for the proposed
rule the HHS stated, “[T]here should not be a major impact associated with
113 Id. at 1265.
114 See id. at 1267.
115 See id.  Principal organic hazardous constituents are essentially toxic organic com-
pounds that would only be partially broken down and thus subject to EPA’s regulatory
authority. Id. at 1265.
116 Id. at 1267.
117 584 F.3d 1076, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
118 Id.
119 See id. at 1080.
120 Id. at 1081–82.  This distinguishes CSX Transportation from the First Opportunity for
Comment category.  See supra subsection II.B.1.
121 See CSX Transp., 584 F.3d at 1082.
122 746 F.3d 1102, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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this proposed change.”123  The “final rule adopt[ed] the exact opposite
interpretation of the” formula, which indeed created a major financial
impact on the hospital industry.124  Clearly, the public did not have the
opportunity to comment on the final rule and, to that end, only a few hospi-
tals even bothered to submit comments—some number did not even under-
stand the rule.125  Thus, agencies are not allowed to propose to clarify a rule
and use that as a Trojan horse to change a major rule.126
The preceding categories are not exclusive and they all rest on the basic
principle of fair notice.127  Part II argues that the agencies succeed and fail in
sufficiently distinct ways to allow an aggregation of cases into distinct catego-
ries.  This Note will test the validity of Part II by applying its framework to the
waters of the United States case study in Part III.
III. LOGICAL OUTGROWTH APPLIED TO WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES
A. Proposed Rule and Final Rule
Part III proceeds first by outlining the substance of the waters of the
United States Proposed Rule.  It will then cover the differences between the
final rule and proposed rule.  Finally, Part III will apply the categories devel-
oped in Part II in order to determine whether the waters of the United States
rule is a logical outgrowth of the Proposed Rule.  The case study methodol-
ogy provides a ready example; the rule is detailed and complex, which pro-
vides ample examples to illustrate the Part II categories.
The proposed rule defined seven categories together constituting the
waters of the United States.  The first four categories constituted the tradi-
tional and longstanding definitions of “waters” and were not subject to any
substantive revision.  They included: (1) traditional navigable waters; (2)
interstate waters; (3) territorial seas; and (4) impoundments of the United
States.128  Tributaries, though previously included in past regulations, would
now include only those tributaries that flow into Categories 1 through 3.129
The sixth category, adjacent waters, proposed a significant change from prior
practice.  This category previously covered adjacent wetlands, which were at
123 Id. (quoting Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Pro-
spective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2004 Rates, 68 Fed. Reg. 27,154, 27,416 (May 19,
2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413)).
124 Id. at 1106–07.
125 See id. at 1106.
126 See also Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding
no logical outgrowth when the EPA issued notice where it “proposed to codify” an inter-
pretation it had previously used, but adopted an entirely different interpretation in the
final rule).
127 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007).
128 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 22,188, 22,198 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R.
pts. 110, 112, 116–17, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401).
129 See id. at 22,198–99.
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issue in the most recent Supreme Court decision on the subject,130 but the
proposed rule sought to cover all adjacent waters, not merely wetlands.131
Categories 1 through 6 all shared the commonality that they were per se
jurisdictions—the agencies presumed all categories to be waters of the
United States.  Finally, the proposed rule provided for a seventh, catchall,
“other waters” category that included any waters determined, on a case-by-
case basis, to have a significant nexus with one of the first three categories of
waters.132  Unlike Categories 1 through 6, Category 7 would not be per se
jurisdictional.133
Also relevant to the logical outgrowth analysis, the proposed rule
included a definitions section.  In Rapanos v. United States, the most recent
Supreme Court case on waters of the United States, the plurality opinion cast
doubt on the proper definition of “adjacent waters.”134  In order to clarify
any tension post-Rapanos, the Proposed Rule defined “adjacent” as “border-
ing, contiguous or neighboring.”135  The rule then further defined “neigh-
boring” as: “waters located within the riparian area or floodplain of a water
identified in [one of the first five categories], or waters with a shallow subsur-
face hydrologic connection or confined surface hydrologic connection to
such a jurisdictional water.”136  Nowhere in the definition section, nor in the
“other waters” category, is there any mention of a specific distance from a
high-water mark.  In fact, there is no mention of any distance from a high-
water mark throughout the entire proposed rule.
The EPA and the Corps of Engineers requested specific comments on its
seventh, “other waters” category.137  As discussed previously in this Note, a
specific request for comment was critical to surviving judicial review.138  The
agencies acknowledged there were several alternate approaches to the “other
waters” category and they requested comment whether they could aggregate
“similarly situated” waters, but this topic was the extent to which the agencies
requested specific feedback.139  There were three primary alternatives.  First,
130 For a discussion of the characterization of adjacent wetlands and whether they fall
under the scope of the Clean Water Act, see Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739–42
(2006) (plurality opinion); see also infra Section IV.B.
131 Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg.
at 22,199.
132 Id. The term “significant nexus” is a term of art common throughout the three
relevant Supreme Court cases on waters of the United States and will be covered in more
depth. See infra Section IV.B.
133 Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg.
at 22,199.
134 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742.
135 Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg.
at 22,263.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 22,215–17.
138 See, e.g., supra subsection II.A.1.
139 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 22,214.
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the agencies could determine that other waters are similarly situated in spe-
cific regions of the country.140  Next, the agencies could take a mixed
approach and add specific water types that would always be jurisdictional
waters of the United States, while other subcategories would remain a case-
by-case analysis.141  Finally, the agencies requested comment on an approach
not favored by the agencies: no waters would be deemed similarly situated.142
In sum, the requests for comments focused on the extent to which the agen-
cies could group waters as similarly situated.  The closest the proposed rule
came to suggesting a bright-line rule for other waters was that “the agencies
solicit comment and information . . . to determine if there are opportunities
to provide greater clarity, certainty, and predictability for establishing juris-
diction over ‘other waters.’”143
The agencies received well over one million comments on their pro-
posed rule.144  From these comments and based on “the agencies’ technical
expertise and experience,”145 the final rule reflected several significant
changes.  Categories 1 through 6 remained substantively unchanged from
the proposed rule,146 except to the extent that changes to the definition sec-
tion, discussed below, affected the sixth category (adjacent waters).147  The
former seventh category (other waters) was split into two categories.  The
new seventh category specified five types of waters—all deemed to be simi-
larly situated, but which would still be subject to the case-by-case analysis.148
The new eighth category specified that:
[W]aters located within the 100-year floodplain of a traditional navigable
water, interstate water, or the territorial seas, and waters located within 4,000
feet from the high tide line or the ordinary high water mark of traditional
navigable waters, interstate waters, the territorial seas, impoundments, or
covered tributaries may be found to have a significant nexus on a case-spe-
cific basis, but the agencies have not made a determination that the waters
are “similarly situated.”149
140 Id. at 22,215.  For example, waters in the Central California Valley or in the Atlantic
Coastal Pine Barrens could be deemed, by rule, to be similarly situated. See id.
141 See id. at 22,216.  For example, prairie potholes, Carolina and Delmarva bays, and
others could be added as jurisdictional categories. Id.
142 See id. at 22,217.
143 Id. at 22,214.
144 See Definitions of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, REGULATIONS
.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880 (last visited
Oct. 27, 2016).
145 Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054
(June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116–17, 122,
230, 232, 300, 302, 401).
146 See id. at 37,073.
147 See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
148 See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,073.  The five types of waters are: (1) prairie potholes; (2) Delmarva and Carolina bays;
(3) pocosins; (4) western vernal pools in California; and (5) Texas coastal prairie wetlands.
Id.
149 Id. (emphasis added).
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The final rule makes one additional change of significant import to the
logical outgrowth analysis.  The definition of the term “neighboring”
changed to include “all waters within the 100-year floodplain of a traditional
navigable water, interstate water, the territorial seas, an impoundment, or a
covered tributary that is located in whole or in part within 1,500 feet of the
ordinary high water mark of that jurisdictional water.”150  Similar to the
“other waters” definition, the Proposed Rule did not include any distance
from the high-water mark in the definition of “neighboring.”151  Litigation
followed closely on the heels of the final rule.  Parties challenging the rule
focused on the use of bright-line boundaries in the Final Rule, which did not
appear in the Proposed Rule.152
B. Is the Final Rule a Logical Outgrowth?
1. Applying Categories Where Court Affirms Agency Action
This Section will compare the changes from the Proposed Rule to the
Final Rule using the framework established in Part II.  Subsection III.B.1
applies the categories affirming agency action.  There are several examples
within the rules illustrating the categories affirming agency action.  Subsec-
tion III.B.2 applies the categories reversing agency action, and concludes that
the third reversal category, termed Unexpressed Intention of the Agency, is
the best fit for the joint EPA and Corps of Engineers rule.
The first affirmance category occurs when an agency requests comment
on a specific change it is contemplating.  This was illustrated in the Proposed
Rule where the EPA and Corps of Engineers proposed determining that cer-
tain categories were per se jurisdictional waters of the United States rather
than case-specific.153  The agencies stated that they would consider including
prairie potholes, Carolina and Delmarva bays, pocosins, Texas coastal prairie
wetlands, and western vernal pools in the jurisdictional category.154  They did
exactly that in the Final Rule.  In the Final Rule, these specific water bodies
were separated from case-by-case “other waters” into their own category.155
This example fits neatly within the Agency Contemplating Specific Change
category and a court would likely affirm this element of the Final Rule
because the agencies specifically asked for comment on the exact bodies of
water they sought to regulate in the Final Rule.
150 Id. at 37,081 (emphasis added).
151 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 22,188, 22,263 (Apr. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts. 110,
112, 116–17, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401).
152 See, e.g., State Petitioners’ Motion for Stay Pending Review at 3–4, 7–10, In re EPA,
803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-3799, 15-3822, 15-3853, 15-3887) [hereinafter
Motion for Stay Pending Review].
153 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 22,216.
154 Id.
155 See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,054, 37,086–87; supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL209.txt unknown Seq: 19 19-JAN-17 9:49
2016] defining  fair  notice 961
The second affirmance category occurs when the agency states that cer-
tain elements of its proposed rule may be unnecessary and abandons the
element in the final rule.  Here, the agencies did not abandon any substantial
element from the proposed rule to the final rule.  They did notify the public
that they would consider additional approaches for the “other waters” cate-
gory.  Specifically, the agencies sought comment on proposals to determine
that certain other waters were similarly situated, which would reduce the bur-
den of determining each other water on a case-by-case basis.156  The agencies
also acknowledged that they could abandon the similarly situated proposal
and conduct all “other water” analyses on a case-by-case basis.157  Ultimately,
the agencies chose to use similarly situated categories.158  This example rep-
resents a close call, but because the agencies did not actually abandon any
specific element between the proposed and final rules, this category is not
applicable.
The third affirmance category arises where the final rule falls within the
proposed range of alternatives.  The Proposed Rule does not implicate this
category, but it is possible to imagine a hypothetical situation where the agen-
cies could have successfully used this category to defend the Final Rule.  For
example, if the agencies had proposed to regulate other waters at 3,000,
5,000, or 8,000 feet from the high-water mark then a final rule at 4,000 feet
would certainly have been foreseeable by the public.159
The fourth and fifth affirmance categories apply when there is a defect
in the procedural process, but the defect is cured either due to harmless
error or actual notice, respectively.  The fourth affirmance category, the
harmless error doctrine, is also likely not at issue.  The 4,000-feet high-water
mark rule likely includes a greater swath of waters than was originally pro-
posed.160  Furthermore, the cost of a permit, required when a body of water
is under federal jurisdiction, is substantial.161  Thus, the high cost, in both
time and money, for a permit will result in a substantial burden for those
within the scope of the regulation.  The fifth and final category is actual
notice, which must come from the agency and not from the public’s attempt-
ing to monitor over a million comments.  This is not readily discernable from
156 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 22,215–17.
157 Id. at 22,217.
158 See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,071.
159 Cf. City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also supra sub-
section II.A.3 (discussing City of Waukesha v. EPA and the third affirming category).
160 The true extent of the 4,000-foot rule is undeveloped and unclear.  The State peti-
tioners in the current litigation against the Rule argue that the lack of notice deprived the
states of gathering evidence or presenting evidence about the impact of the 4,000-foot
rule. See Motion for Stay Pending Review, supra note 152, at 9.
161 In Rapanos, Justice Scalia catalogued the potential costs.  “[A]n individual permit
spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process, and the average applicant for a
nationwide permit spends 313 days and $28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or
design changes.”  Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (plurality opinion).
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either the Final Rule or the electronic docket.  A reasonable inference, how-
ever, is that the agencies would likely have difficulty providing actual notice
to twenty-nine states, environmental groups, and private industry plain-
tiffs.162  At best, actual notice might come out during litigation, but is not
within the purview of this Note.  In sum, the case study provides examples
where some affirming categories do apply and other categories do not apply.
But none of the categories fully justifies the bright-line limits found in the
Final Rule.
2. Applying Reversal Categories
The first reversal category is the first opportunity for comment category.
This occurs when an agency proposes to regulate a specific area and instead
regulates an entirely different category.  Here, this is likely not an accurate
description.  The Proposed Rule clearly notified the public that the “other
waters” category sought to regulate bodies with a significant nexus to the
waters of the United States.163  The Final Rule covers largely the same con-
tent.  For example, the Proposed Rule sought to regulate all waters with a
significant nexus with traditional navigable waters; the Final Rule does gener-
ally the same.164
The second reversal category is where a final rule is overinclusive com-
pared to the proposed rule.  The second category is not an accurate descrip-
tion of the rule.  The Final Rule creates eight definitional subsections.165
While it is true that the Proposed Rule had seven subsections, the new eighth
subsection is a bifurcation of part of the Proposed Rule; the substance is the
same.166  Furthermore, the agencies gave notice that they were considering
providing greater clarity by creating a new definitional category.167  Consider
a hypothetical example.  This category would apply if the agencies kept the
original categories and added a new category covering swimming pools;
surely that would be outside the set covered by the Proposed Rule.  Nothing
like that occurred here, and thus the second reversal category does not
describe the Final Rule.
The third reversal category is the best fit for the Final Rule.  The third
category applies when an agency puts special or different emphasis or differ-
ent detail in a final rule than it did in the proposed rule.  Here, the NPRM
162 These groups are all litigating against the Final Rule and claim a logical outgrowth
procedural defect. See Amena H. Saiyid, Environmental Groups Join Water Rule Challenges, 46
ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2173, 2203 (2015).
163 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 22,211.
164 See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,059.
165 See id. at 37,104–05.
166 See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.
167 See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,071 (noting how “agencies specifically sought comment in the proposal on options to
address” the new category).
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notified the public that certain bodies would fall in the “other waters” cate-
gory.  The rule proposed to determine “other waters” on a case-by-case basis,
either individually or by similarly situated waters.168  Yet, there was no men-
tion that any distance from a high-water mark was even relevant to, much less
determinative of, whether an “other water” body fell under federal jurisdic-
tion.169  The circumstances here provide even less notice than the represen-
tative cases in subsection II.B.3.  For example, in CSX Transportation, Inc. v.
Surface Transportation Board, the court reversed the agency’s attempt to use
four years of data in the final rule where it notified the public it would use
only one year of data.170  The agency in CSX Transportation gave notice as to
how it would calculate the data, but failed to notice the proper range of data.
Here, the EPA and the Corps of Engineers not only failed to give notice
regarding how the government would calculate the data (i.e., by using the
high-water mark), but also failed to do so as to the range of the data (i.e.,
4,000 feet).  At bottom, the agencies failed to provide the essence of logical
outgrowth—fair notice—(1) that they were planning on using a bright-line
rule to calculate their category; and (2) what the bright-line rule would be in
order to calculate which waters would fall in the “other waters” category.
The agencies used a similarly flawed methodology in defining “adjacent
waters.”  Recall that the definition turned on the definition of “neighbor-
ing.”171  The Proposed Rule did not include a hint that any distance from a
high-water mark would be used to define the term “neighboring.”172  The
Final Rule defined it as 1,500 feet from the high-water mark.173  Like the
“other waters” subsection, there was no indication that the term “neighbor-
ing” would be defined at any distance from a high-water mark and there was
no indication that 1,500 feet would govern “neighboring” and, thus, “adja-
cent waters.”  Both bright-line rules—in the “other waters” subsection and
the definition of “neighboring”—are not a logical outgrowth of anything in
the Proposed Rule.
The fourth reversal category is when an agency proposes merely to clar-
ify an existing rule, but in fact substantively alters the rule.  Here in the Final
Rule, the agencies stated that they were clarifying the existing definition of
“waters of the United States.”174  This language seems to implicate the fourth
reversal category.  Yet, an examination of the substance of the Proposed Rule
demonstrates sufficient notice that the agencies proposed to alter the previ-
ous definition.  The executive summary stated that the “proposed rule
168 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 22,211.
169 For example, the proposed rule would aggregate similarly situated waters by “the
functions they perform and their spatial arrangement within the ‘region’ or watershed.”
Id.
170 584 F.3d 1076, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
171 See supra notes 130–31, 150 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
173 See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,105.
174 See id. at 37,055.
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defin[es] the scope of waters protected under the Clean Water Act.”175  Fur-
thermore, “The proposed rule would revise the existing definition of ‘waters
of the United States’ consistent with the science and [previous] Supreme
Court cases.”176  The previous Supreme Court cases curtailed the previous
definitions of “waters of the United States,”177 essentially invited the agencies
to redefine the waters of the United States,178 and created doubt in the appli-
cation of the law.179  Thus, when the agencies proposed to revise the existing
definition and attempted to provide clarity, the logical inference for the pub-
lic was that the rule clarification would in fact be substantive.  The agencies
signaled that this was an important, substantive undertaking and the volume
of public comments received confirmed the public knew the importance of
the definition.180  Therefore, the fourth reversal category is not appropriate
for this procedural process.
In sum, the agencies’ process suffered from significant logical outgrowth
defects.  The Proposed Rule did not give any hint that a bright-line distance
from high-water marks would be used to define any category.  The Final Rule
placed a new emphasis on the linear distance affecting two categories.  The
public did not have actual notice, nor was this a harmless error; thus, the
defect was not cured.  Logical outgrowth is not a bright-line rule and it is
possible a court could find there was a logical outgrowth, but this Note
argues that based on categories derived from past caselaw there was no logi-
cal outgrowth.  While such a holding would be fatal in the present case, it is
not fatal in the overall rulemaking process because the remedy for a procedu-
ral defect is remand to the agency so it can get a second bite at the apple.181
Indeed, a court could remand only the portions of the rule that are defective
and maintain all validly promulgated sections of the rule.182  Thus, this Note
will conclude with a brief review of the substantive law that courts will review.
IV. WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES RULE IN SUBSTANCE
A. Judicial Review of Agency Action and Chevron Doctrine
The Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of agency
action.183  Yet, the APA does not instruct courts on what deference, if any,
175 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 22,190.
176 Id. at 22,192.
177 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 726–27, 739 (2006) (plurality
opinion).
178 See id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
179 See id. (“It is unfortunate that no opinion commands a majority of the Court . . . .
Lower courts and regulated entities will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case
basis.”).
180 See supra note 144.
181 See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
182 See supra subsection II.B.2.
183 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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judges should give to agency interpretation of statutes passed by Congress.184
Judicial review is essential because Congress delegates vast powers to agen-
cies, which are then exercised without the benefit of the democratic pro-
cess—namely, bicameralism and presentment.185  The Supreme Court took
up the question of judicial review in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.186
In Chevron, the EPA sought to promulgate regulations defining “station-
ary sources” of air pollution under the Clean Air Act.187  Congress did not
define the term “stationary sources” and the Court articulated a two-part test
to evaluate whether the agency’s interpretation of the term was permissible.
First, a reviewing court asks whether Congress has spoken on the precise
question at issue.188  If Congress’s intent is clear then a reviewing court con-
cludes its inquiry because both the court and the agency must give effect to
Congress’s intent.189  If, however, the court determines that Congress’s
intent is not clear on the precise issue, then the second step says that the
court defers to the agency as long as the agency’s construction is permissi-
ble.190  Courts seized on this two-part test and applied it to agency statutory
interpretation cases.191
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., represents a prototypical Chevron
application.192  Congress amended the Clean Air Act to include a Good
Neighbor Provision, which charged states with prohibiting pollution that
would contribute to downwind pollution of other states.193  The EPA promul-
gated regulations based on the Good Neighbor Provision that, among other
factors, considered costs when determining emission reductions of upwind
states.194  The Court applied Chevron to determine whether the EPA properly
interpreted the Good Neighbor Provision.  First, the Court noted that the
Good Neighbor Provision requires states to eliminate significant “amounts”
of pollution that contribute to downwind pollution, but the statute was not
clear on how to divide responsibility or regulate the “amounts” of pollu-
184 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944). Skidmore was a pre-APA case,
but section 706 of the APA focuses on adequacy of process, not substance. See Kristin E.
Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1235, 1249 n.79 (2007).
185 See David S. Tatel, The Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental Law, 34
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010).
186 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
187 Id. at 839–40.
188 Id. at 842.
189 See id. at 842–43.
190 See id. at 843.
191 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833 (2001). But see Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to
Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 730 (2007) (arguing that Chevron “applies less often” and
is much less frequently cited by the Supreme Court).
192 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
193 See id. at 1593.
194 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL209.txt unknown Seq: 24 19-JAN-17 9:49
966 notre dame law review [vol. 92:2
tion.195  Once the Court concluded that the statute does not dictate how to
regulate downwind emissions, it analyzed whether the EPA’s interpretation
was permissible under Chevron’s second step.196  The Court agreed with the
EPA that it should consider both the magnitude of a state’s upwind pollution
contribution and the cost of eliminating that pollution.197  This example
demonstrates Chevron’s two-step process.
Chevron deference is not a blank check; subsequent Supreme Court cases
emphasized that “agencies must operate ‘within the bounds of reasonable
interpretation.’”198  Reasonable agency interpretation includes both the spe-
cific context of the language at issue and also the overall context of the entire
statute.199  For example, in Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that
the EPA did not employ a reasonable interpretation when it declined to con-
sider any costs in regulating power plants.200  There, Congress authorized
the EPA to regulate power plant emissions only if such regulation was “appro-
priate and necessary.”201  The Court reasoned “appropriate” must include at
least some consideration of cost by the agency.202  It also considered the
overall statutory context in arriving at its holding.203 Michigan v. EPA dem-
onstrates that courts will look at both the language at issue and the overall
statutory scheme to determine whether an agency’s interpretation under
Chevron was permissible, and will reverse an impermissible construction.
With the basic structure of agency statutory interpretation in mind, this Note
will review the previous Supreme Court waters of the United States jurispru-
dence and use Chevron to comment on the validity of the current Waters of
the United States Final Rule.
B. Previous Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Waters of the United States
The Supreme Court previously interpreted the definition of “waters of
the United States” in a trilogy of cases.  First, in United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., the Court held that the Corps of Engineers’ interpreta-
tion of certain nonnavigable waters was permissible.204  The Corps defined
“waters of the United States” to include not only traditional navigable waters,
but also nonnavigable waters that could affect interstate commerce and wet-
195 Id. at 1603–04.
196 Id. at 1606.
197 Id. at 1606–07.
198 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (quoting City of
Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)).
199 See id.
200 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015).
201 See id. at 2707 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012)).
202 See id.
203 See id. at 2708.
204 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985).
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lands that were adjacent to traditional navigable waters.205  The Court
applied Chevron to determine whether the Corps’ interpretation was
proper.206  First, the Court determined that the term “waters” was not suscep-
tible to a clear definition.207  From a scientific perspective, water and land
are not clearly distinct.  For that reason, the Court acknowledged that “the
Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land
begins.”208  Second, the Court determined the Corps’ interpretation of the
Clean Water Act was reasonable.209  Noting the difficulty of defining where
navigable waters end and where adjacent waters begin, the Court held that
wetlands adjacent to a navigable waterway were within the regulatory scope of
the Corps.210
Next, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”), the Court held that the Corps’ interpretation
of “navigable waters” was not a permissible construction of the Clean Water
Act.211  After Riverside Bayview and leading up to SWANCC, the Corps of Engi-
neers continued to adopt regulations that broadened the scope of waters that
were considered the waters of the United States.212  At issue here was a rule
under which the presence of a migratory bird on an otherwise nonnavigable
water made that water subject to regulation as interstate commerce and thus
falling under Corps regulation.213  Practically, the so-called Migratory Bird
Rule meant that any water, no matter how remote or disconnected from navi-
gable waters, would be subject to federal regulation as soon as a migratory
bird alighted on the water.  First, the Court characterized the holding in Riv-
erside Bayview to require a “significant nexus between the wetlands and naviga-
ble waters.”214  The nexus was present in Riverside Bayview, but not in
SWANCC.  The Court did not apply Chevron to the Corps’ interpretation
because it was operating on the outer limits of Congress’s enumerated pow-
ers and the Court suggested that even if it were to apply Chevron, the Corps’
interpretation would still fail under the first step because the statute was
clear.215  Congress did not provide a clear statement that it intended to regu-
late such remote waters that any migratory bird could reach.216  The lack of
both a clear statement and a significant nexus proved fatal to the Corps; the
205 See id. at 123–24 (first citing Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean
Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (July 25, 1975); then citing 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2)(h)
(1976); and then citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1978)).
206 Id. at 131.
207 See id. at 132.
208 Id.
209 See id. at 134.
210 See id. 134–35.
211 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
212 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 725–26 (2006) (plurality opinion) (dis-
cussing history prior to SWANCC).
213 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty., 531 U.S. at 164.
214 Id. at 167 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
215 Id. at 172.
216 See id. at 172–74.
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Court held that the Migratory Bird Rule exceeded the authority under the
Clean Water Act.217
Finally, in Rapanos v. United States, a plurality of the Court held that cer-
tain remote wetlands could not fall under navigable waters without meeting
specific requirements.218 Rapanos concerned Corps jurisdiction over wet-
lands, which were near ditches and other man-made drains that eventually
emptied into traditional navigable waters.219  Justice Scalia’s plurality opin-
ion declined to give the Corps any Chevron deference.  First, the language of
the Clean Water Act included only continuously present, fixed bodies rather
than ordinarily dry channels through which water occasionally flows or other
ephemeral water flows.220  Second, even if the Court found the language to
include non-traditional, ephemeral waters, the Corps’ interpretation was
impermissible under Chevron’s second step.  The Corps’ broad reading of the
Clean Water Act was an impermissible infringement on state and local power
and, like SWANCC, required a clear statement from Congress to authorize
such an intrusion on state authority.221  The plurality read Riverside Bayview
and SWANCC to permit federal jurisdiction in the following situation only:
there must be (1) wetlands with a continuous surface connection; and (2)
that connection must be to bodies of water that are waters of the United
States in their own right.222
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion laid out a more expansive stan-
dard by which the Corps could determine whether adjacent wetlands were in
fact navigable waters.  Justice Kennedy focused on the significant nexus
between wetlands and navigable waters.223 Riverside Bayview and SWANCC
established that the Clean Water Act did not grant jurisdiction to nonnaviga-
ble waters without a significant nexus present between the two types of
waters.224  Justice Kennedy focused greatly on the significant nexus concept.
In order to exert jurisdiction, the EPA and the Corps must show that the
wetlands (or other nonnavigable waters) “significantly affect the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily under-
stood as ‘navigable.’”225  Furthermore, the Corps must establish the signifi-
cant nexus on a case-by-case basis for wetlands adjacent to nonnavigable
waters.226  It does not need a case-by-case determination for wetlands adja-
cent to navigable waters.227  Justice Kennedy determined that, using his sig-
217 Id. at 174.
218 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006) (plurality opinion).
219 See id. at 729.
220 Id. at 733.
221 See id. at 737–38.
222 Id. at 742.
223 Id. at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
224 See id.
225 Id. at 780.
226 Id. at 782.  Justice Kennedy invited more specific regulations to govern the signifi-
cant nexus jurisdiction in order to ameliorate the need for a case-by-case analysis. See id.
227 Id. (“When the Corps seeks to regulate wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters,
it may rely on adjacency to establish its jurisdiction.”).
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nificant nexus standard, the current regulations were potentially
overbroad,228 but attacked the plurality’s standard as lacking in practical
sense,229 and lacking in fidelity to Riverside Bayview’s holding.230  Thus, post-
Rapanos, the agencies had two options to regulate jurisdiction of nonnaviga-
ble waters: the plurality’s narrow, two-part test or Justice Kennedy’s signifi-
cant nexus analysis.
Before turning to the current rule, it is important to consider one last
opinion.  Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion admonishing the
Corps and the EPA for not undertaking the rulemaking process, after
SWANCC, to settle the question at hand.231  He noted that agencies generally
have broad deference under Chevron to interpret a statute, but the agencies
failed to complete the rulemaking process after SWANCC.232  Had the agen-
cies implemented regulations with “some notion of an outer bound [on] the
reach of their authority,” the Court would have extended some measure of
deference.233  Coming out of Rapanos, the agencies had an opportunity to
clarify the definition of “waters of the United States,” albeit with some outer
boundaries.234  Thus, the Note will turn to the joint EPA and Corps of Engi-
neers Final Rule in light of Chevron and the waters of the United States
trilogy.
C. Applying Chevron to Final Rule
The Corps of Engineers and EPA sought to remedy the mixed guidance
post-Rapanos by publishing their final rule defining waters of the United
States.  First, the agencies asserted that the rulings in SWANCC and Rapanos
did not limit their authority to regulate traditional navigable waters or non-
navigable interstate waters.235  The agencies acknowledged that their intra-
state nonnavigable jurisdiction was narrower than previous regulations.236
The agencies sought to remedy the jurisdictional uncertainty; indeed, one
purpose of the rule was to provide clarity and reduce litigation.237  In the
abstract, there were several possible standards to form the basis for jurisdic-
tion of nonnavigable waters: the Rapanos plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy’s
228 Id.
229 Id. at 769.
230 Id. at 772.
231 See id. at 757–58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
232 See id. at 758.
233 Id.
234 In addition to the Chief Justice’s opinion, Justice Kennedy’s opinion also invited the
Corps and the EPA to promulgate regulations to clarify the Clean Water Act. See id. at
780–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
235 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 22,188, 22,257 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R.
pts. 110, 112, 116–17, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401).
236 Id. at 22,189.
237 See id. at 22,190.
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significant nexus standard, or possibly some third, broader option.238  The
agencies chose Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos standard.239  In fact, throughout
the Legal Analysis appendix to the Proposed Rule, the agencies repeatedly
based their legal reasoning and conclusions entirely on Justice Kennedy’s
framework.240  In order for the Final Rule to pass judicial review, the agen-
cies would need to convince at least five Justices to sign on to Justice Ken-
nedy’s standard.
The statutory language of the Clean Water Act is ambiguous and would
likely meet the requirements for Chevron step one.  The Clean Water Act pro-
hibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters.241  Navigable waters
are defined as “waters of the United States.”242  This is the same statutory
language at issue in Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, and Rapanos.243  The agen-
cies claimed, in the proposed rule, that their regulatory interpretation was
narrower because of the previous decisions.244  If this statement is true, then
the previous cases suggest the Court would accept a Chevron step one inter-
pretation.  As Chief Justice Roberts wrote in his concurring opinion, “Given
the broad, somewhat ambiguous, but nonetheless clearly limiting terms . . . ,
the Corps and the EPA would have enjoyed plenty of room to operate in
developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their authority.”245
Furthermore, both Justice Kennedy’s246 and Justice Stevens’s dissents found
ambiguity in the statutory language.247  Thus, it is likely that a reviewing
court would also find a statutory ambiguity on the precise question at issue.
The case would likely turn on whether the new definition was permissi-
ble under Chevron step two.  Under traditional Chevron doctrine, once an
agency establishes an ambiguity in the first step its interpretation will receive
deference from the reviewing court.248  Yet, the history of SWANCC and
238 Though not discussed in this Note, the dissent in Rapanos would have permitted the
Corps’ broad definition and regulatory framework. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 788 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
239 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 22,192 (“[T]he agencies determined that it is reasonable and appropriate to apply
the ‘significant nexus’ standard for CWA jurisdiction that Justice Kennedy’s opinion
applied to adjacent wetlands to other categories of water bodies as well . . . to determine
whether they are subject to CWA jurisdiction, either by rule or on a case-specific basis.”).
240 See id. at 22,252 (noting a lack of uniformity in federal courts of appeals decisions as
to which standard applies); see also Heather Keith, Comment, United States v. Rapanos: Is
“Waters of the United States” Necessary for Clean Water Act Jurisdiction?, 3 SETON HALL CIR. REV.
565, 600–02 (2007) (same).
241 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12) (2012); see also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723.
242 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
243 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723–26 (discussing previous cases).
244 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 22,189.
245 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
246 See id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Congress’ choice of
words creates difficulties . . . .”).
247 See id. at 796, 804 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248 See supra Section IV.A.
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Rapanos demonstrates that the interpretation cannot be unlimited.  The
prior caselaw shows that the dispositive question will be: Is the EPA and
Corps interpretation permissible?  An agency’s interpretation must be per-
missible both in the context of the language at issue and the overall context
of the statute.249  Here, the agencies sought to correct the deficiencies that
led to previous reversals in SWANCC and Rapanos.  In so doing, they pur-
ported to select an interpretation of the Clean Water Act that was narrower
than the broad definitions pre-Rapanos and focused extensively on Justice
Kennedy’s significant nexus framework.250  If true, reviewing courts will likely
uphold the rule.
Attorneys for the agencies have argued that the Final Rule is simpler
than its predecessors, it provides clarity, and the limitations in the rule
should alleviate any concerns on the Court.251  Yet, opposing attorneys have
claimed that the rule will not provide clarity and the use of the ordinary high-
water mark bright-line rule is problematic.252  Unsurprisingly, both sides
believe that their interpretation of the rule is correct.  Ultimately, two factors
weigh in favor of a reviewing court upholding the rule.  First, the rule does
everything it can to incorporate Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus stan-
dard.253  Second, as the Final Rule notes, a majority of circuit courts have
applied Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus standard, either by itself or with
the plurality opinion, in various decisions.254  On balance, the Final Rule is
likely a permissible interpretation of the Clean Water Act.
CONCLUSION
This Note seeks to remedy a gap in the logical outgrowth literature.
Courts of appeals apply logical outgrowth doctrine by reciting formulaic lan-
guage from previous cases.  Logical outgrowth lacks bright-line rules and it
necessarily requires a fact-based inquiry.  This could, in theory, allow judges
to reach whatever outcome they desire.  This Note argues that there is
enough similarity between certain logical outgrowth cases to group and
organize them by agency win or loss.  The categories proposed in this Note
represent common, though by no means exclusive, types of logical outgrowth
249 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (citing Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
250 See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,053, 37,060–61 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts. 110,
112, 116–17, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 400).
251 See Scott Schang et al., EPA’s “Waters of the United States” Rule: Substance and Signifi-
cance, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,995, 10,966–97 (2015) (statement of Ken Kopocis).
252 See id. at 10,999–11,000 (statement of Deidre Duncan).
253 See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text.
254 See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 22,252 (first citing United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 948 (2007); then citing United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d. 174, 176 (3rd
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2409 (2012); and then citing United States v. Bailey, 571
F.3d 791, 798–99 (8th Cir. 2009)).
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cases.  What is the utility of such an exercise?  It is simply this: an agency or
court can use the categories annotated in this Note to avoid logical out-
growth deficiencies.
The Note uses the current waters of the United States Final Rule litiga-
tion as a backdrop and case study to illustrate the applicability of the pro-
posed logical outgrowth categories.  This is proof of concept.  The Note
argues that at least two elements of the Final Rule fit within the reversal logi-
cal outgrowth categories and therefore the rule should be remanded back to
the EPA and the Corps of Engineers for the opportunity to provide proper
notice-and-comment.  Finally, the agencies likely interpreted the substance of
the Clean Water Act correctly and, assuming they fix the procedural defect,
their interpretation would survive judicial review.  This rule has been many
years in the making and the procedural defect will only delay effective gui-
dance to the public, industry, and local regulators; however, the Administra-
tive Procedure Act requires government action to follow a lawful process.
